Trade Integration and the Polarisation of Eco-Labelling Strategies by Danilina, Vera
HAL Id: halshs-01556484
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01556484
Preprint submitted on 5 Jul 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Trade Integration and the Polarisation of Eco-Labelling
Strategies
Vera Danilina
To cite this version:
Vera Danilina. Trade Integration and the Polarisation of Eco-Labelling Strategies. 2017. ￿halshs-
01556484￿
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2017 - Nr 25
Trade Integration and the Polarisation of Eco-Labelling Strategies
Vera Danilina
Trade Integration and the Polarisation of
Eco-Labelling Strategies*
Vera Danilina†
Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE
July 5, 2017
Abstract
Growing ecological concerns give rise to salient discussions of green policy
impact within different social sciences domains. This research studies the
outcomes of voluntary environmental labelling in autarky and upon trade in-
tegration in the presence of two types of heterogeneity, across countries and
across producers. It investigates the impact of the two main types of eco-
labels - multiple-criteria-based programmes (ISO Type I) and self-declared
environmental claims (ISO Type II), both of which are simultaneously in-
troduced due to the environmental concerns of consumers. The model illus-
trates the polarisation of eco-labels when the least productive firms tend to
avoid green strategies, lower-middle productive and the most efficient firms
are incentivized to greenwash, and the upper-middle productive firms choose
trustful programmes. It also shows that voluntary green restrictions lead to
substantial productivity effects in the market upon opening to international
trade, conditionally, depending on the type of the labelling and the relative
degree of environmental awareness across trading countries. The model pre-
dicts average market productivity losses and within segments productivity
gains for the relatively more eco-concerned country, while the effects for the
relatively less eco-concerned country are the opposite.
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1 Introduction
Environmental labelling belongs to a wide range of green policy instruments that
fall under the umbrella of voluntary environmental programmes (VEPs). VEPs
represent a relatively new tool that emerged in the 1980s. They are highly diversi-
fied: they include eco-standards, stewardship certificates, ranking and rating, green
mutual funds, environmental management systems, environmental declarations,
codes of conduct, reporting standards, green trademarks, and eco-labels (Boström
and Klintman, 2008). VEPs reflect the shortcomings of the direct, or command
and control, approach to green regulation, ongoing shift towards environmentally-
friendly consumer behaviour, complexity of production processes, deepening inter-
national economic integration, and the redistribution of economic power towards
producers and consumers.
Eco-labels are one of the most widely applied voluntary policy instruments.
They can be introduced by different economic agents - firms, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), industry and trade associations, government - at their own
discretion to distinguish particular products or technologies as environmentally
friendly. Many of them are not country-specific but used worldwide. Voluntary
eco-labels are supposed to push the producer beyond the official regulation thresh-
old strengthening the reputation and widening the market niche. The diversity
and flexibility of this type of regulation led to its rapid development1 which raised
issues about their possible economic consequences.
The main goal of this paper is to discover the productivity effects of voluntary
environmental labelling in autarky and upon trade integration. The framework
is based on the three key elements: (1) two types of heterogeneity, across coun-
tries and across producers; (2) two types of eco-labels; and (3) one source of
eco-concerns. (1) The heterogeneity of countries implies the difference in the at-
titude of the society towards environmental problems, and the heterogeneity of
producers relies on the difference in their productivity à la Melitz (2003). (2) The
model investigates two types of eco-labels, multiple-criteria-based third-party pro-
grammes (ISO Type I), and self-declared environmental claims (self-declarations,
1Gruère (2013) reports a fivefold increase in the number of environmental labelling and infor-
mation schemes from 1970 to 2012.
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ISO Type II), simultaneously existing in the market and voluntarily chosen by
producers. (3) Generally, producers can be encouraged to introduce green pro-
grammes by the government, their business partners, the staff, or/and consumers.
The present model relies on the environmental bias in consumers’ preferences as
the only incentive for firms to implement VEPs while other economic agents remain
eco-indifferent.
Consumers environmental preferences are based on the country-specific level of
eco-concerns that disclose the interactions between environment and society and
corresponding changes in consumer behaviour.2 Particularly, the model introduces
eco-quality as an environmental characteristic of any product variety that is defined
by country-specific eco-concerns and the promotion activity of label stakeholders.
Conditional to the type of eco-label, eco-quality acts as an external or an internal
stimulus shifting producers’ influence to consumers’ purchasing decisions.
The eco-indifference of the government implies the lack of public monitoring
of the quality of environmental regulation. This leaves room for greenwashing,
or eco-cheating strategy of firms shaped in the model by ISO Type II standards
(internal VEPs). The only control within the present model is provided by NGOs
who act as stakeholders of ISO Type I standards (external VEPs).
The model delivers three major results. First, it shows the polarisation of eco-
labels when the least productive firms avoid green labelling, lower-middle and the
most productive firms tend to greenwash (or introduce internal VEPs), and the
upper-middle productive firms opt for the green products of verified quality (ex-
ternal VEPs). Thus, the lack of public monitoring increases the attractiveness of
false environmental labels for producers from different productivity sub-segments.
Meanwhile, conditional to the particular characteristics of external VEPs and eco-
bias on consumer preferences, firms can avoid eco-labelling. The only exception is
the most productive producers who are motivated to greenwash even when envi-
ronmental concerns in the society are relatively modest.
The second major result discloses the role of eco-concerns in autarky. The
increase in green bias preferences yields tougher market competition forcing the
least productive firms to leave the industry and the more productive to introduce
2The study of these patterns forms the core of environmental sociology, a relatively new
research domain that emerged in the 1970s (Catton Jr. and Dunlap, 1978).
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eco-friendly programmes. As a result, the non-labelled (brown) segment becomes
narrower but on average less efficient due to the relatively stronger impact on
existing brown firms who remain in the market and choose eco-friendly strategies.
Accordingly, the labelled (green) segment also faces efficiency decline. Meanwhile,
due to the redistribution of firms across market segments, the average market
productivity increases.
Finally, the model illustrates the productivity effects of eco-labelling upon trade
integration. Exposure to trade with a relatively less eco-concerned country affects
the average productivity in green and brown market segments similarly. Trade
integration opens the room for less efficient firms to enter the market with brown
strategies. Additionally, it incentivises the least productive green firms to dis-
continue eco-friendly programmes. The latter effect dominates the former, and
the average productivity within brown segment increases. It also determines the
average productivity growth within the green segment. Meanwhile, due to the
reallocation of firms across segments, the average market productivity in a more
eco-concerned country declines - the opposite holds true with a less eco-concerned
country. The model also illustrates the analogous but mirror-like effect in the
case of the cross-country eco-heterogeneity growth assuming the aggregate green
demand remains constant.
The focus of the research links the present paper to the two main strands
of studies. First, to the numerous literature on voluntary environmental pro-
grammes, particularly, on the role of NGO and firm-level eco-labelling3. Second,
to the growing but still relatively scarce studies aiming to investigate the trade and
environment issues from the perspective of Melitz’s heterogeneous firms approach
(2003)4. Among other research questions, these studies are focused on exploring
the relationship between productivity, the green behaviour of producers, and the
corresponding welfare and environmental effects5. This paper contributes to the
literature by focusing on the impact of consumers’ eco-concerns about the environ-
3A recent comprehensive review of the theoretical research on labels is provided by Bonroy
and Constantatos (2014).
4Cherniwchan et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive overview of the relevant studies, both
theoretical and empirical.
5See Batrakova and Davies (2012), Cui et al. (2012), Kreickemeier and Richter (2014), Ro-
drigue and Soumonni (2014), Forslid et al. (2015), Scott Holladay (2016).
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mental choices made by firms in a framework that mirrors the current structure
of voluntary environmental regulation. To the best of my knowledge, it is the
first attempt to design the model that captures two types of heterogeneity, across
producers and countries, and two types of environmental labelling, in order to
investigate the market sorting and market efficiency patterns.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the devel-
opment of eco-labelling. Section 3 overviews the environmental sociology findings
related to the ecological concerns hypothesis. Section 4 introduces the eco-quality
concept and corresponding types of VEPs. Sections 5, 6 and 7 outline the model
and the results of comparative statics. Section 8 presents the quantitative analysis.
And Section 9 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Eco-Labelling
Product labelling can be defined "as any policy instrument of a government or
other third party that somehow regulates the presentation of product-specific infor-
mation to consumers" (Teisl and Roe, 1998). Accordingly, eco-labelling includes
any type of environmental "cradle-to-grave" impact of products.
Eco-labelling is one of the most significant and influencing type of VEPs6.
Whereas the labelling itself is not a new phenomenon7, eco-labelling is a part of the
recent trends in the world green development.8 Wide discussions of this initiative
started in the 1970s and 80s on the occasion of the German Blue Angel (Der Blaue
Engel) label9 implementation and the activity of the International Federation of
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)10 (Boström and Klintman, 2008). The
6For the purpose of this research let’s follow the most broad approach to eco-labelling, referring
to eco-label as a general term capturing all ways of environmentally-friendly goods and services
symbolic differentiation.
7The first documented initiative of labelling was the White Label Campaign in cotton under-
wear production implemented in 1898 (Boström and Klintman, 2008).
8In some sectors eco-labelling initiatives started relatively early. In Germany, Italy, and
France eco-labels were introduced in the food industry in the 1920s (Basu et al., 2007).
9The Blue Angel label was implemented in Germany in 1978 as the first fully developed
nationwide eco-labelling scheme in the world.
10International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) was established in
1972 on the initiative of French farmer organisation Nature et Progrès with the support of
different institutions from the UK, the USA, Sweden, and South Africa. It is an international
umbrella organization that helps to facilitate any organic initiatives all over the world.
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first multinational eco-label the Nordic Ecolabel (Nordic Swan) was established in
1989 in Norway.11
In 2016 the Ecolabel Index, a global directory of eco-labelling, contained 465
eco-labels represented in 199 countries and 25 industry sectors12. Eco-labelling
programmes are unevenly distributed in the world, with the largest concentration
in North America (with the leadership of the USA - 203 eco-labels) and Europe
(the leaders are Germany - 102 eco-labels, the UK - 89 eco-labels, Switzerland - 79
eco-labels, and France - 72 eco-labels) (see Figures 1 and 2)13. The most significant
ecolabelling systems serve from 5% to 20% of the market (Amacher et al., 2004).
VEPs are widely represented in the agenda of firms including B2B segments.
The broad online survey of the perspectives on eco-labelling conducted by the Insti-
tute of Management and Development (IMD) and École Polytechnique Fédérale de
Lausanne in Switzerland14 reports the following reasons for producers to introduce
green programmes: (1) to strengthen the brand and differentiate it in the market,
(2) to fulfil the eco-biased preferences of consumers and investors, (3) to diminish
the risk of being attacked by green NGOs, (4) to address investors demands, and
(5) to contribute to overall environmental awareness in society (Comas Martí and
Seifert, 2012).
At the same time, some practitioners report an excessive number of eco-identifiers
which decreases their value and expected income leading to the establishment of
"a new industry of ’selling stickers’". They also show some scepticism concerning
eco-labels including their credibility, lack of transparent and clear criteria, and
their possible role as technical barriers to trade. Some arguments are based on
the lack of evidence about the actual impact of eco-labelling which leads to a
misunderstanding of their importance in industry development.
The significance of eco-labelling is non-negligible in light of the credence goods
11A deep investigation of the main trends supporting the implementation of eco-labels and
sceptical and encouraging arguments of their use are provided by Boström and Klintman (2008),
pp.19-26 and pp.67-82 respectively.
12Gruère (2013) and Gruère (2015) provide a comprehensive overview of environmental la-
belling and information schemes worldwide - its development and classification approaches.
13The data was retrieved from http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ on 13.08.2016.
14The survey is based on 1,052 responses of practitioners who have received training at IMD
business school (the whole sample is 8,553 practitioners, 12% of which provided complete re-
sponses to the questionnaire). The target group was selected according to the criteria of the
industry of activity and function (Comas Martí and Seifert, 2012).
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Figure 1: Distribution of Eco-Labels: World
(number of eco-labels available in the market)
Source: Ecolabelindex http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ 13.08.2016.
concept (Darby and Karni, 1973)15 which applies to products in a relationship
with their environmental footprint. Green quality of a particular variety cannot be
discovered by consumers on the basis of their experience or knowledge forcing them
to rely on additional information. Accordingly, eco-labels are often a subject of
wide informational campaigns (Comas Martí and Seifert, 2012). These campaigns
aim to overcome the information overload and to fill the attitude-behaviour gap
caused by a lack of clear behaviour patterns for consumers to translate their eco-
concerns into eco-friendly behaviour (Young et al., 2010).
Empirical evidence of eco-labelling as a factor influencing consumer choice has
15Darby and Karni (1973) establish the background for two closely related concepts of credence
goods. One strand of literature focuses on the case when a consumer is not able to specify
the needs ex ante the purchase but observe the utility ex post (see, for example, Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006) for an overview of the literature related to this concept of credence goods).
Examples of this include medical or taxi services. The second strand of literature treats credence
goods as a type of product consumers are willing to buy but unable to observe the utility even
after the purchase. For example, non-GMO or environmentally-friendly goods whose pronounced
characteristics are prohibitively expensive or even impossible to verify by individuals.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Eco-Labels: Europe
(number of eco-labels available in the market)
Source: Ecolabelindex http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ 13.08.2016.
been steadily growing. At the same time, the majority of these studies deals with
stated rather than with revealed preferences. In other words, most of the studies
are focused on a hypothetical consumer willingness to choose environmentally-
friendly varieties rather than on their actual behaviour.16 In general, they report
the existence of potential green bias in consumption.
Relatively scarce is the analysis of revealed eco-preferences. Investigations of
this type illustrate the actual choice of consumers. Table 1 summarises the re-
sults of the selected empirical studies estimating the revealed eco-preferences. In
general, they also show the existence of green bias in consumer purchases which
16Empirical evidence of stated eco-preferences is provided, for example, by Teisl et al. (1999),
Imkamp (2000), Johnston et al. (2001), Roe et al. (2001), Moon et al. (2002), Gadema and
Oglethorpe (2011), Echeverría et al. (2014).
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varies conditionally on the type of goods, the significance of the label, and/or the
size of the price premium. For example, studying the impact of one of the most
developed European eco-labels, the Nordic Ecolabel, Bjørner et al. (2004) report
that consumers pay a 13%-18% premia for the certified varieties.
Table 1: Selected Empirical Evidence of Revealed Eco-Preferences
Study Country Products/Label Period N. of obs. Results
Henion
(1972)
USA detergent/
experimental*
1970 n/a +
Nimon and
Beghin
(1999)
USA apparel / or-
ganic
1996 794 +/-**
Teisl et al.
(2002)
USA canned tuna/
dolphin-safe
1988-95 2 mln. +
Bjørner
et al. (2004)
Denmark toilet paper,
paper towels,
detergents/
Nordic Swan
1997-
2001
1,596 +
Vanclay
et al. (2011)
Australia food/
experimental*
2008 2,890 +
Hallstein
and Villas-
Boas (2013)
USA fish/
experimental*
2006 3,942 +/-* * *
Elofsson
et al. (2016)
Sweden milk/
experimental*
2013 4,13 mln. +
* specially invented for a field experiment
** price premium for organic cotton, no premium for the environmentally friendly dyes,
and a discount for "no-dyes" varieties
* * * statistically significant decline in sales of mid-eco-destructive varieties, no effect for
the most and the least eco-destructive varieties.
The existing empirical evidence shows the significance of eco-labelling for con-
sumers’ purchasing decisions. At the same time these studies do not explore the
roots of green-biased preferences and related eco-concerns as well as the reasons
for their possible variation. This research question belongs in the range of issues
studied in environmental sociology.
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3 Environmental Concerns
Franzen and Vogl (2013) state that "individuals react in three distinct ways to
environmental problems: having rational insight into the problem, being willing to
act, and being emotionally affected by environmental degradation". Environmental
sociology develops three basic hypotheses to explain the existence and variation
of eco-appreciation across individuals and countries: Ingelhart’s post-materialism
hypothesis, Dunlap and Van Liere’s "New Environmental Paradigm" hypothesis ,
and prosperity or affluence hypothesis.17
Inglehart (1995) considers a relationship between social development and en-
vironmental concerns: analogously to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943),
more prosperous societies adopt post-materialistic values including ecological aware-
ness. At the same time less developed countries can also demonstrate a high level
of green concerns in response to a low quality of environment due to underdevelop-
ment. This refers to the objective problems and subjective values hypothesis that
allows for two independent effects on the green awareness growth: shift to post-
material values and immediate response to the quality of environment. Dunlap
and Van Liere’s "New Environmental Paradigm" (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978)
states that green concerns are in line with global development despite the wealth in
society. And affluence, or prosperity, hypothesis (Diekmann and Franzen, 1999) is
related to the positive relationship between national wealth and ecological aware-
ness.
Franzen and Meyer (2010) define these hypotheses stating "that environmental
concern depends on wealth, that it depends on post-material values, and that wealth
should not matter". The latter is also supported by empirical studies18 that explore
other significant factors influencing eco-appreciation level, such as the distribution
of wealth, quality of environment, population density, age and gender, educational
level, and various sociodemographic characteristics19.
17Franzen and Meyer (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of these hypotheses.
18See, for example, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980), Franzen and Meyer (2010), Meyer (2015).
19These findings are also in line with the concept of green consumerism as a part of the politi-
cal consumption phenomenon implying the global responsibility-taking behaviour of individuals
(Micheletti, 2003). Consumers can express their concerns through boycotting some products
or by buycotting them (Boström and Klintman, 2008). The latter leads to choosing particular
goods or products because of their "political" qualities even if it turns out to be more expensive.
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4 Eco-Quality Within Different Types of VEPs
In order to link environmental concerns to green-biased preferences of consumers
underpinning VEPs, I introduce the eco-quality concept. For the purpose of this
research eco-quality is defined as a set of pronounced characteristics of any prod-
uct variety referring to its environmental impact. Thus, eco-quality indicates the
promoted ecological image of the variety rather than its real environmental impact
(e.g., its carbon footprint, related emissions, type of the production technology).
At the same time, if the relationship between green technological and promotional
activities is determined by an environmental policy or the design of environmental
regulation, eco-quality also refers to its actual environmental footprint.
Let’s denote eco-quality as 𝜒𝑖 ≥ 0, a value assigned to each variety produced
in the economy. The model defines eco-quality 𝜒𝑖 = 𝜒[𝑝𝑟𝑖, 𝜀]20 as a differen-
tiable strictly concave continuous function increasing in promotion activity of
eco-label stakeholders21 𝑝𝑟 ≥ 0 and in the level of environmental concerns (or
eco-appreciation level) in the country 𝜀 ≥ 0 such that 𝜒[0, 𝜀] = 𝜒[𝑝𝑟, 0] = 0,
𝜒
′′
𝑝𝑟 𝜀 > 0.22 Accordingly, the model considers a class of functional forms that re-
flect the hypothesis stating the positive relationship between the promotion effect
and the eco-appreciation level. Meanwhile, let’s also assume the elasticity of the
eco-quality with respect to each of the dependent variables to vary such that the
efficiency of promotion decreases with its growth.
Eco-appreciation denoted by 𝜀 is an external parameter reflecting the country-
specific degree of environmental concerns. It captures cross-country differences in
environmental problems evaluation: in societies with a higher level of environmen-
tal concerns the same signals cause more significant positive shift in preferences.
For the purpose of this research let’s assume non-zero eco-appreciation level (𝜀 > 0)
The political consumption phenomenon finds its roots in the US-nonimportation movement of
1764-76. Though such movements emerged strongly in the mid-nineteenth century (Boström and
Klintman, 2008), green consumerism entered the environmental agenda only in the 1980s.
20Throughout the paper square brackets are used to group the arguments of any function.
21The role of an eco-label stakeholder can be played by an institution responsible for a voluntary
environmental programme or by a firm who introduces the VEP.
22Thus, the model allows consumer preferences to depend on firm-level promotion investments.
Amacher et al. (2004) introduce a similar assumption within the duopoly model of vertical prod-
uct framework differentiation but they do not make the distinction between fixed and variable
components of investments.
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in all countries in the model to motivate the introduction of eco-labels.
Eco-quality is independent of the size of technological efforts made by firms
because of credence nature of the majority of goods’ environmental characteristics
and the assumption of governmental eco-indifference. As far as consumers are
not able to distinguish between eco-friendly and eco-destructive varieties without
corresponding promotional programmes, the model assumes them to trust the
information they obtain from producers. It also implies zero transaction costs:
signals concerning eco-quality of varieties are perfectly diffused in the economy
and equally appreciated by all consumers.
Types of Voluntary Environmental Labelling
The general classification of environmental labelling is based on the ISO classifica-
tion that defines three major types of eco-labels. Type I is environmental labelling
defined as "voluntary, multiple-criteria-based third party programme that awards
a licence which authorizes the use of environmental labels on products indicating
overall environmental preferability of a product within a particular product cate-
gory based on life cycle considerations" (ISO 14024: 1999). Type II are eco-labels
related to the self-declared environmental claims defined as "statement, symbol or
graphic that indicates an environmental aspect of a product, a component or pack-
aging that is made, without independent third-party certification, by manufacturers,
importers, distributors, retailers or anyone else likely to benefit from such a claim"
(ISO 14021: 1999, 2016). And the most recent is the Type III -environmental
declarations that provide "quantified environmental data using predetermined pa-
rameters and, where relevant, additional environmental information" (ISO 14025:
2006).
The model allows for the two types of voluntary activities, external and internal
programmes, which correspond to ISO 14024 (Type I) and ISO 14021 (Type II)
international standards respectively. The parameters of VEPs are summarised in
the Table 2.
External voluntary environmental labelling (ISO 14024: 1999 Type I) can
be supported by any institution, e.g. NGO, industry association, or government.
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Table 2: VEPs Parameters
technology application/ promotion eco-quality
licence fees expenditures
External
VEPs 𝑇 > 0 𝐹𝑎 > 0 𝐴 ≫ 𝐹𝑎 𝜒[𝐴, 𝜀]
ISO 14024 0 < 1 − 𝐹𝑙 < 1
(Type I)
Internal
VEPs 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 1 - 𝑎𝑖 > 0 𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀]
ISO 14021
(Type II)
To join an external VEP firms need to meet the requirements of the programme23:
they pay the application fee 𝐹𝑎 > 0 as additional fixed costs and licence fee as a
share of the turnover 0 < 1 − 𝐹𝑙 < 1; they also develop a production process that
changes marginal input by a factor of 𝑇 > 0.24 Accordingly, the model allows for
the "win-win" Porter hypothesis (𝑇 < 1) that considers the case when environ-
mental regulation acts as an instrument of technological improvement (Porter and
van der Linde, 1995).25 Greening the technology is less costly for more productive
firms.
Members of the programme benefit from the promotion activity of the eco-
labelling supporting institution that is much greater than the fixed spending of
a firm (𝐴 ≫ 𝐹𝑎). The eco-quality of any labelled variety is represented by the
parameter 𝜒 = 𝜒[𝐴, 𝜀].
23The proposed structure of external VEP generally mirrors the selected eco-labelling pro-
grammes, particularly, the Nordic Eco-Label, the Blue Angel, and EU Ecolabel, which use one
of the most sophisticated fee structures. They also introduce special criteria for different types
of products (the Nordic Eco-Label) or countries (EU Ecolabel). To the best of my knowledge,
the majority of existing eco-labelling programmes follow the same fee structure or simplify it.
24I assume the parameters of the external VEP to be constant over the time period of the
model. They can be subject to changes due to NGOs’ willingness to adjust the programme
according to the market response. This possibility is ruled out from the present model.
25It is necessary to mention that the Porter hypothesis is still a doubtful concept due to the
mixed empirical evidence of the relationship between environmental and financial performance
of firms (see Horváthová (2010) for a brief overview and a meta-analysis of the relevant empirical
studies published in 1980-2007).
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Internal voluntary environmental labelling (ISO 14021:2016 Type II) refer-
ring to self-declarations are developed individually by firms who make the decision
concerning green technological changes that increase the marginal input by 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 1
and corresponding promotional activity 𝑎𝑖 > 0, where index 𝑖 refers to a firm. The
model considers any green technology to be more costly assuming that any avail-
able more efficient technology has been already implemented by any firm. Similar
to external VEPs, identical green technologies are less costly to implement for more
productive firms. In contrast with external VEP, the producer is totally respon-
sible for the promotional activity 𝑎𝑖: if 𝑎𝑖 = 0 consumers are not informed about
the green quality of the variety. The eco-quality is represented by 𝜒𝑖 = 𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀].
5 General Assumptions of the Structural Model
This model extends a framework with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003) by intro-
ducing environmental quality of varieties, or eco-quality. It considers a one-factor
two-industries economy with an eco-destructive (dirty) good 𝐷 and a clean outside
good 𝐶.
Preferences are biased due to environmental concerns and represented by a
nested Cobb-Douglas-CES utility function with the Cobb-Douglas parameter 0 <
𝛼 < 1 and elasticity of substitution between varieties 𝜎 > 126:
𝑈 = 𝐷𝛼𝐶1−𝛼, 𝐷 =
[︂∫︁ ∞
𝑚∈𝑀
(𝜒𝑚 + 1)
1
𝜎 (𝑑𝑚)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑚
]︂ 𝜎
𝜎−1
, (1)
where 𝑀 represents the measure of varieties available in the market.
Thus, consumer satisfaction increases with the share of consumed green goods.
This assumption is in line with at least two concepts in economics. First, it
follows Lancaster (1966) who states that particular attributes of goods but not
goods per se determine the purchasing decision. Second, it is also related to the
impure altruism concept introduced by Andreoni (1989) that implies an increase
in utility from the act of giving: by buying green varieties consumers contribute
to environmental improvement.
26The eco-quality parameter is introduced to the utility function in such a way that higher
elasticity of substitution devalues promotion: if consumers are more prone to switch from one
variety to another, more efforts are needed to motivate them to choose green varieties persistently.
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The design of the utility function also fits a wide strand of literature on quality
in trade.27 This research allows the quality parameter to be independent from the
productivity of the firms but shaped by an external eco-concerns parameter and
promotional activity that can be internal or external conditionally on the type of
eco-labelling programme.
Industry C is used as a numéraire: it is perfectly competitive and exhibits
constant returns to scale. All costs are measured in labour (the only factor in
the economy) that is homogeneous and perfectly mobile across industries but im-
mobile internationally. Production in industry 𝐶 does not cause any negative
environmental effects28. Let’s normalise wages 𝑤 = 1. Then, by construction, if
the output of the industry is positive, 𝑃𝐶 = 1.
Industry D is represented by a continuum set of firms heterogeneous in produc-
tivity, each of which produces one variety of good D in monopolistic competition
with the same increasing returns to scale technology such that each firm faces fixed
overhead costs 𝑓 > 0. They pay fixed costs 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 > 0 to enter the market. Upon
entry, firms draw their productivity 𝜙 from a non-degenerate distribution 𝐺[𝜙]
and then make two consecutive decisions, to stay or leave the market immediately,
and to choose any type of green technology or remain brown.
To reduce environmental damage, firms in industry 𝐷 can introduce a voluntary
environmental programme. Thus, the market is comprised of two segments: a green
segment formed by firms changing the technology and joining any type of VEP,
external or internal; and a brown segment formed by firms preserving the initial
technology. Let’s assume that only green firms implement promotion programmes
to influence consumer choice.
27See, for example, Hallak (2006), Kugler and Verhoogen (2011), Crinò and Epifani (2012),
Crozet et al. (2012), Johnson (2012), Hallak and Sivadasan (2013).
28Industry 𝐶 can also be considered environmental unfriendly. Since it is modelled in a perfect
competitive setting where the technology is identical across firms, their output remains constant
yielding environmental effect that can be treated as a shifter. Accordingly, it does not influence
the final results.
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6 Autarky
Let’s first investigate the closed economy where firms can choose between joining
one of the VEP programmes, external or internal, or preserving the initial (brown)
status.
6.1 Environmental Strategies
Brown strategy. Any firm opting for brown strategy in autarky faces the de-
mand 𝑑𝑖𝑏 = 𝛼𝐿𝑃 𝜎−1(𝑝𝑖𝑏)−𝜎 and sets the price 𝑝𝑖𝑏 =
𝜎
𝜎−1(𝜙
𝑖)−1, where 𝑃 1−𝜎 =∫︀
𝑚∈𝑀(𝜒
𝑚 + 1)(𝑝𝑚)1−𝜎𝑑𝐺[𝜙] is a CES type eco-quality adjusted price index that
also accounts for the consumer green goods price perception. Then the optimal
profit in increasing and convex in 𝜙 and represented as
(2)𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑓,
where 𝐵 , 𝛼𝐿(𝜎 − 1)𝜎−1𝜎−𝜎.
Green external strategy. Any firm opting for a green external strategy faces
the demand 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜒[𝐴, 𝜀] + 1)(𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡)−𝜎. Maximising the profit 𝜋𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡] =
(𝐹ℓ𝑝
𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝑇 (𝜙𝑖)−1) 𝑞[𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡] − 𝐹𝑎 − 𝑓 , they set the optimal price 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎−1
𝑇
𝐹ℓ
(𝜙𝑖)−1.
The expectation of a positive green price premium implies 𝑇
𝐹ℓ
> 1 but for the
present analysis this assumption can be relaxed. Thus, the model allows for
cheaper green varieties due to two factors, high productivity of producers and
more efficient green technology.
Then the optimal profit is increasing and convex in 𝜙 and represented as
(3)𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1ℰ(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝐹𝑎 − 𝑓,
where ℰ ≡ 𝐹 𝜎ℓ 𝑇 1−𝜎(𝜒[𝐴, 𝜀] + 1).
Green internal strategy. The demand for goods labelled with self-declarations
is represented by 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀] + 1)(𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡)−𝜎. Firms make the decision
on price 𝑝𝑖, technological 𝑡𝑖 and promotional 𝑎𝑖 activities maximising the profits
𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝑝
𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑎
𝑖, 𝑡𝑖] = (𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖(𝜙𝑖)−1) 𝑞[𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡] − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓 s.t. 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 1, 𝑎𝑖 > 0.29 Accordingly,
29The function 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑡𝑖] is concave due the assumption of the eco-quality function con-
cavity.
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green internal firms set the optimal price 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝜎
𝜎−1(𝜙
𝑖)−1 and make no additional
technological changes 𝑡𝑖 = 1 that is related to the greenwashing phenomena as a
result of the lack of public monitoring assumption. They also choose the promotion
activity according to 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1𝜒′𝑎[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀](𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 = 1, 𝑎[0, 𝜀] = 0. The latter defines the
function 𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀] as increasing in 𝜙 > 0 (Appendix 10.1). Thus, more productive
firms spend more on promotion.
Optimal profit that is increasing and convex (if 𝜎 ≥ 2)30 in 𝜙 is represented as
(4)𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜒[𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀], 𝜀] + 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀] − 𝑓
6.2 Environmental Market Segmentation
The relative parameters of the VEPs determine the environmental structure of
the market. Let’s consider the environmentally-mixed case with non-empty sets of
firms implementing each type of eco-strategy. Then the profit functions (2) - (4)
yield the following productivity composition (Figure 3):
∙ the least productive firms with productivity 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙*𝑏 , 𝜙*𝑔𝑚] remain brown;31
∙ lower-middle productive firms with productivity 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙*𝑔𝑚, 𝜙*𝑒] introduce
green internal programmes;32
∙ upper-middle productive firms with productivity 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙*𝑒, 𝜙*𝑔𝑙] join green
external programmes;33
∙ the most productive firms with productivity 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙*𝑔𝑙,∞) ("greenwashing
leaders") introduce green internal programmes.
30The requirement that 𝜎 ≥ 2 is an over-sufficient condition stems from the unique elasticity
of substitution within and across green and brown sub-sectors assumption (see Appendix 10.2
for the details). It is also necessary to mention that regardless of the framework of this paper,
empirical literature generally estimates the elasticity of substitution 𝜎 > 2 (see, for example,
Disdier and Head (2008), Head and Mayer (2014)).
31The sub-sector exists if 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙
*
𝑏 ] > 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑔𝑚[𝜙
*
𝑏 ] which implies relatively low returns on promotion
expenditures.
32The sub-segment exists if ∀𝜙 ∈ (𝜙*𝑔𝑚, 𝜙*𝑒), 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙] > 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑏 [𝜙], 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙] > 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙] which implies
𝑓 < 𝑎[𝜙,𝜀]𝜒[𝑎[𝜙,𝜀],𝜀] <
𝐹𝑎
ℰ[𝜀]−1 . Thus, fixed expenditures on VEP correspond to higher returns of
promotion expenditures within green internal relative to green external labelling.
33The sub-segment exists if ∀𝜙 ∈ (𝜙*𝑒, 𝜙*𝑔𝑙), 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙] > 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙] which implies ℰ ≥ 𝜒[𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀], 𝜀]+1,
𝐹𝑎 ≥ 𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀], and returns of promotion expenditures within green internal relative to green
external labelling are lower 𝑎[𝜙,𝜀]𝜒[𝑎[𝜙,𝜀],𝜀] >
𝐹𝑎
ℰ[𝜀]−1 .
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Figure 3: Environmental Market Segmentation in Autarky
The cutoff productivities are determined by a brown segment zero profit con-
dition (ZPC) and a set of indifference conditions (IC) for each green sub-segment
such that
𝑍𝑃𝐶 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙
*
𝑏 ] = 0 (5)
𝐼𝐶𝑔𝑚 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚] = 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑏 [𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚] (6)
𝐼𝐶𝑒 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑒] = 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
*
𝑒] (7)
𝐼𝐶𝑔𝑙 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙] = 𝜋
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙] (8)
The average productivity within each segment and sub-segment can be repre-
sented as a weighted average such that ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑙𝑟 = 1𝐺(𝜙*𝑟)−𝐺(𝜙*𝑙 ) ∫︀ 𝜙*𝑟𝜙*𝑙 𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙], where
𝜙*𝑙 and 𝜙*𝑟 denote the minimum and maximum productivity cutoffs within the
sub-segment respectively.
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The model assumes firms’ free entry that drives ex-ante expected profits to the
market entry costs:
(9)
∫︁ 𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝜙*𝑏
𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︁ 𝜙*𝑒
𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +∫︁ 𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝜙*𝑒
𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︁ ∞
𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] = 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
By plugging (5) into (6)-(9), I obtain four equations that allow to determine the
cutoff and average productivities in all segments and sub-segments in the market
(Appendix 10.3).
6.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Stationary equilibrium requires the labor market to be clear over time. Industry
𝐶 spends on labor (1 − 𝛼)𝐿 and the dirty industry 𝐷 𝛼𝐿. Then the labor market
clearing condition is represented as
𝛼𝐿 = 𝐿𝑏[𝑀𝑏, 𝜙
*
𝑏 , 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚] +𝐿𝑔𝑚[𝑀𝑔𝑚, 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚, 𝜙
*
𝑒] +𝐿𝑒[𝑀𝑒, 𝜙
*
𝑒, 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙] +𝐿𝑔𝑙[𝑀𝑔𝑙, 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙] +𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦,
(10)
where 𝐿𝑘[𝑀𝑘, 𝜙*𝑙 , 𝜙*𝑟] and 𝑀𝑘, 𝑘 = 𝑏, 𝑔𝑚, 𝑒, 𝑔𝑙, represent aggregate labour input
and mass of firms within the market sub-segment bounded by productivities 𝜙*𝑙
and 𝜙*𝑟, 𝜙*𝑙 ≤ 𝜙*𝑟. Accordingly, the mass of producing firms is defined as
(11)𝑀 = 𝑀𝑏[𝑀 ] + 𝑀𝑔𝑚[𝑀 ] + 𝑀𝑒[𝑀 ] + 𝑀𝑔𝑙[𝑀 ]
such that
𝑀𝑘 =
𝐺[𝜙*𝑟] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑙 ]
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏 ]
𝑀, 𝑘 = 𝑏, 𝑔𝑚, 𝑒, 𝑔𝑙 (12)
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 denotes the labor required to cover the sunk costs of entering firms such
that 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, where 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 represents fixed entrance costs, and 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
is a mass of entrants such that 𝑀 = (1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏 ])𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦.
Accordingly, labor market clearing condition (10) allows to define the total
mass of varieties available in the market.
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6.4 Comparative Statics
A comparative statics analysis shows, first, that the eco-concerns growth increases
a brown sub-segment cutoff productivity implying more productive firms serving
the market. Meanwhile, the green cutoffs decrease in all sub-segments. More-
over, the model shows that the "productivity windows" for all environmentally-
pronounced segments increase, leading to less productive firms supplying green
varieties (Figure 4). The third result indicates the changes in average produc-
tivity across and within segments. Thus, eco-appreciation growth leads to lower
average efficiency within brown and green segments. The impact within the green
sub-segments depends on the productivity distribution. The only exception is the
sub-segment of greenwashing leaders that faces the decline in average productivity.
Meanwhile, the market becomes more productive overall (Appendix 10.4).
Figure 4: Productivity Composition in Autarky
(arrows indicate the direction of cutoff productivities’ motion occurring with eco-
appreciation growth)
7 Open Economy
Now let’s consider trade integration of countries 𝑋 and 𝑌 . The countries are iden-
tical in all parameters except eco-appreciation 𝜀𝑋 ̸= 𝜀𝑌 . Export implies symmetric
iceberg transport costs 𝜏𝑋 = 𝜏𝑌 = 𝜏 , such that a fraction 𝜏 ∈ (0, 1] of a traded
good arrives to its destination. The model also assumes zero fixed exporting costs,
hence, within trade integration all firms export. Upon opening to trade, firms
follow the same environmental strategy in both markets.
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7.1 Environmental Strategies
Brown strategy. Any brown firm in country 𝑋 trading with country 𝑌 sets
the prices 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑋𝑋 =
𝜎
𝜎−1(𝜙
𝑖)−1 and 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑋𝑌 = 𝜏−1𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑋𝑋 to sell at home and abroad
respectively. Accordingly, the optimal profit is represented as
(13)(𝜋𝑋)𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵
(︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌
)︀
(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑓,
where 𝑃𝑋 and 𝑃𝑌 denote eco-quality adjusted CES price indexes of varieties sold
in the markets of country 𝑋 and 𝑌 respectively and 𝜔 ≡ 𝜏𝜎−1 is a measure of
trade openness.
Green external strategy. Upon opening to international trade any firm adopt-
ing a green external strategy in country 𝑋 sets profit maximising prices at home
𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑋𝑋 =
𝜎
𝜎−1
𝑇
𝐹ℓ
(𝜙𝑖)−1 and abroad 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑋𝑌 = 𝜏−1𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑋𝑋 and faces the optimal profit
(14)(𝜋𝑋)𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵
{︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 ℰ𝑋 + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 ℰ𝑌
}︀
(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝐹𝑎 − 𝑓
Green internal strategy. Any green internal firm in the open economy op-
timally sets the prices 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑋𝑋 =
𝜎
𝜎−1(𝜙
𝑖)−1 and 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑋𝑌 = 𝜏−1𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑋𝑋 , makes no
technological efforts 𝑡𝑖 = 1, and chooses the promotional activity in accordance
with the promotion function 𝑎𝑋 [𝜙𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔] such that
(15)𝐵
{︁
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎, 𝜀𝑌 ]
}︁
𝜙𝜎−1 = 1
The promotion function increases in all its arguments including the openness to
trade parameter (Appendix 10.5). The latter implies that promotion activity is
also increasing with trade integration.
Then the optimal profit is represented as follows
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵
{︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖
𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ] + 1) + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖
𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ] + 1)
}︀
(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑋 − 𝑓
(16)
Following the over-sufficient assumption 𝜎 ≥ 2 as in autarky, the profit function
is increasing and convex in 𝜙 (Appendix 10.6).
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7.2 Environmental Market Segmentation
The relative parameters of the VEPs determine the same four segments in industry
𝐷, defined by the following set of indifference equations
𝐼𝐶𝑔𝑚𝑋 (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚𝑋 ] = (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑏 [𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚𝑋 ] (17)
𝐼𝐶𝑒𝑋 (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑒𝑋 ] = (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑒𝑋 ] (18)
𝐼𝐶𝑔𝑙𝑋 (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙𝑋 ] = (𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙𝑋 ] (19)
and a free entry condition
(20)
∫︁ 𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝑋
𝜙*𝑏𝑋
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑏 [𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︁ 𝜙*𝑒𝑋
𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝑋
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
+
∫︁ 𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝑋
𝜙*𝑒𝑋
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡[𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︁ ∞
𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝑋
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡[𝜙]𝑑𝐺[𝜙] = 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
assuming the zero profit condition (𝜋𝑋)𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑏 [𝜙
*
𝑏𝑋 ] = 0 to hold (Appendix 10.7).
7.3 Stationary Equilibrium
The labor market clearing condition is analogous to the autarky case and repre-
sented as
(21)
𝛼𝐿 = 𝐿𝑏[𝑀𝑏𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑏𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚𝑋 ] + 𝐿𝑔𝑚𝑋 [𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑚𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑒𝑋 ]
+ 𝐿𝑒𝑋 [𝑀𝑒𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑒𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙𝑋 ] + 𝐿𝑔𝑙𝑋 [𝑀𝑔𝑙𝑋 , 𝜙
*
𝑔𝑙𝑋 ] +
𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑋
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
Substituting the masses of firms within each sub-segment according to (12), the
condition (21) allows me to define the aggregate number of varieties produced in
each country.
7.4 Comparative Statics
To study the eco-labelling effects in open economy let’s consider two countries,
𝒢 and ℬ, such that 𝜀𝒢 > 𝜀ℬ: consumers in country 𝒢 are more environmentally
concerned than in country ℬ. Accordingly, 𝜙*𝑏𝒢 > 𝜙*𝑏ℬ, 𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝒢 < 𝜙*𝑔𝑚ℬ, 𝜙*𝑒𝒢 <
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𝜙*𝑒ℬ, 𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝒢 < 𝜙*𝑔𝑙ℬ. Thus, the brown segment is wider in the less eco-concerned
country while the overall green segment is wider in the more eco-concerned country.
The composition of green sub-segments depends on the eco-appreciation difference
across economies.
Table 3: Comparative Statics in Open Economy: cutoff productivity
Brown segment Green segment
cutoff productivity cutoff productivity*
Country 𝒢 Country ℬ Country 𝒢 Country ℬ
(1) Countries with
identical eco-preferences: 0 0
trade effects
(2) Countries with
different eco-preferences: ⇓ ⇑ ⇑ ⇓
trade effects
(3) Trade integration:
eco-difference growth ⇑ ⇑ ⇓ ⇓
effects
* The comparative statics is analogous for all green sub-segments. See Appendix 10.8 for the details.
Note: In the first two cases, country 𝒢 is considered to be more eco-concerned than country ℬ. In
the third case, country 𝒢 experiences an increase in eco-bias while eco-concerns in country ℬ remain
unchanged.
The productivity effects are determined by two factors, trade integration and
eco-heterogeneity across countries. To disentangle the impact of each factor let’s
consider the three following steps. First, let’s investigate trade between eco-
homogeneous countries - a case that is well-studied in the literature. Second, let’s
analyse the general effect of trade integration across eco-heterogeneous countries.
And finally, let’s focus on the influence of the eco-distance between countries to
the dynamics of productivity changes in open economy (Tables 3 and 4, Appendix
10.8).
(1) Trade integration of countries with identical eco-preferences. In the
departure case the model delivers the well-known result: when the countries are
eco-homogeneous and the fixed exporting costs are zero, trade integration does not
influence the cutoff and average productivity.
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Table 4: Comparative Statics in Open Economy: average productivity
Brown average Green average Market average
productivity productivity* productivity
Country 𝒢 Country ℬ Country 𝒢 Country ℬ Country 𝒢 Country ℬ
(1) Countries with
identical eco-preferences: 0 0 0
trade effects
(2) Countries with
different eco-preferences: ⇑ ⇓ ⇑ ⇓ ⇓ ⇑
trade effects
(3) Trade integration:
eco-difference growth ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇑ ⇑
effects
*The comparative statics is analogous for the greenwashing leaders sub-segment. The direction of
average productivity changes within greenwashing lower-middle productive and green external sub-
segments depend on the particular form of the eco-quality function and the productivity distribution.
See Appendix 10.8 for the details.
Note. In the first two cases country 𝒢 is considered to be more eco-concerned than country ℬ. In
the third case country 𝒢 experiences an increase in eco-bias while eco-concerns in country ℬ remain
unchanged.
(2) Trade integration of countries with different eco-preferences. The
second case reflects the overall effect of international trade in the model investi-
gating the productivity effects when the countries are identical in all dimensions
except their eco-concerns.
Before opening to trade, the green market is relatively more efficient in country
ℬ while in country 𝒢 green biased consumers attract more firms to introduce the
VEP. At the same time, brown market productivity cutoff is lower in country
ℬ. Trade integration causes opposite effects, conditionally, on the national eco-
appreciation level. Upon opening to trade less efficient green producers of country
𝒢 are forced to leave the green sector that is in line with the well-known effect of
trade integration. On the contrary, the green sector in country ℬ enlarges due to
the new opportunities of the relatively more green-biased demand in country 𝒢.
As a result, the green sector in country 𝒢 shrinks becoming more efficient while
green sector in country ℬ expands attracting new, less efficient firms.
The effects in the brown market are opposite. Brown firms in country ℬ leave
the market through two exits: the least efficient quit the market (well-studied
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effect of trade integration), the most efficient join the green VEP to benefit from
the expansion to county 𝒢. As a result, the brown sector in country ℬ shrinks.
In country 𝒢 due to trade integration producers get an access to the less eco-
concerned market of country ℬ. Thus, it significantly increases the profits of
brown firms in country 𝒢 opening new opportunities for the least efficient firms to
enter the market. As a result, the brown sector in country 𝒢 expands.
The dynamics of average productivities is opposite across countries. Globali-
sation influences the average eco-appreciation level in the global economy. Thus,
country ℬ faces an increase in eco-concerns because of to trade integration with a
more eco-concerned country 𝒢. As a result, productivity effects coincide with the
effects in autarky arising due to the growth of eco-concerns. The effects for the
country 𝒢 are the opposite.
(3) Eco-difference growth across trading countries. To explore the effects
of increasing eco-heterogeneity across countries let’s consider the case when the
one trading country experiences a growth in eco-concerns while in the other they
remains the same, such that 𝜀𝒢 = 𝜀ℬ + ∆𝜀, ∆𝜀 > 0.
Due to the overall increase in eco-concerns in the global economy, the results of
the comparative statics analysis coincides with the analogous analysis in autarky
with the growth of eco-concerns. Both countries face the increase of brown cutoff
productivities and the decrease of green cutoff as well as average brown and green
productivities. On average the market becomes more competitive and, hence,
efficient due to the redistribution of firms across sub-segments.
8 Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis of eco-labelling effects comprises two steps. First, let’s
focus on the productivity effects under the three cases analysed in the previous
section. Second, I will extend the third stage of the comparative statics analysis
in order to expose numerically the role of eco-heterogeneity in the open economy
eliminating the impact of an overall increase in environmental concerns across
trading countries.
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8.1 Numerical Illustration of Qualitative Analysis
In order to illustrate the effects quantitatively, let’s consider a reduced model with
two environmental sub-sectors, brown and green, where the green sector is shaped
by the external VEP. Then the structural model can be described by a set of four
conditions: indifference and free entry, for each country, respectively (Appendix
10.9).
First, let’s expose numerically the productivity effects under the three cases
discussed in the previous section. To discover the impact I simulate the model
allowing for elasticity of substitution between varieties 𝜎 = [2, 6], Pareto produc-
tivity distribution with the shape 𝑘 = 𝜎+0.25 and scale 𝜙0 = 1. All types of fixed
costs of operation (𝑓) and fixed entry costs (𝑓𝑒) are normalised to 1. The country
is populated by 1000 inhabitants (𝐿).
To determine the parameters of the external VEP I rely on the fee structure of
the most significant European eco-labelling schemes such as The Nordic Eco-Label
and EU Ecolabel, in which on average set the share of licence fees to 1 − 𝐹ℓ =
0.0015. Annual fees 𝐹𝑎 and the technological parameter 𝑇 are determined by the
assumption of the eco-heterogeneity of markets that requires 1 < ℰℬ < ℰ𝒢 < 𝐹𝑎+1.
The former also allows for 𝑇 < 1 which is in line with the Porter hypothesis (Porter
and van der Linde, 1995).
To illustrate the trade integration between countries with different eco-preferences,
I assume the eco-appreciation parameter to be based on the results of Bjørner et al.
(2004) who estimate the Danish consumers marginal willingness to pay for the The
Nordic Ecolabel certified green products to be in the range of 13-18%34. Accord-
ingly, 𝜒𝒢 = 1.18𝜎 − 1 and 𝜒ℬ = 1.13𝜎 − 1.
The model simulated within the above determined ranges delivers similar out-
comes for each set of parameters. Thus, I report the results for the case when
𝜎 = 4, ℰℬ = 1.15, ℰ𝒢 = 1.37, 𝑇 = 1.05, 𝐹𝑎 = 0.7, 𝜏 = 0.5. Figures (5) - (7) illus-
trate the quantitative analysis in the closed and open economy cases respectively.
The results expose the comparative statics numerically. They additionally deliver
the two following results. First, changes in eco-concerns yield a higher impact on
34Bjørner et al. (2004) base their estimations on the data of Danish market. Particularly, they
estimate the consumers’ willingness to pay for toilet paper, paper towels and detergents, certified
by The Nordic Ecolabel in 1997-2001.
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Figure 5: Productivity Effects in the Market with Eco-labels in Autarky
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the green rather than on the brown productivity level, both cutoff and average.
This finding adds one more explanation to the observed results. Second, they show
the absolute differences in productivity changes due to the increase in eco-concerns
across countries: the country with the growing environmental bias in preferences
faces more significant effects in comparison with the country where the green bias
remains on the same level.
8.2 Numerical Extension of Qualitative Analysis
Let’s extend the qualitative analysis results in order to isolate the effect of the
global eco-heterogeneity growth. Comparative statics shows identical productivity
effects across countries as a result of the increase in the overall eco-appreciation
level. To eliminate this effect, let’s investigate productivity effects when country-
level green biases in consumers preferences change in a such a way that 𝜀𝒢 = 𝜀+∆𝜀𝑖,
𝜀ℬ = 𝜀− ∆𝜀𝑗, and
(𝐷𝑔𝒢[𝜀𝒢, 𝜀ℬ] + 𝐷𝑔ℬ[𝜀𝒢, 𝜀ℬ])| 𝜀>0,
Δ𝜀𝑖=0,
Δ𝜀𝑗=0
= (𝐷𝑔𝒢[𝜀𝒢, 𝜀ℬ] + 𝐷𝑔ℬ[𝜀𝒢, 𝜀ℬ])| 𝜀>0,
Δ𝜀𝑖>0,
Δ𝜀𝑗>0
, (22)
where 𝜀 > 0 denotes the initial eco-concerns, and 𝐷𝑔𝒢 and 𝐷𝑔ℬ are the aggregate
spending on green varieties in countries 𝒢 and ℬ respectively. Accordingly, I
assume the global green demand to remain constant despite changes in cross-
country eco-concerns. Then the model can be described by a set of six conditions,
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Figure 6: Productivity Effects in the Market with Eco-labels Upon Trade Integra-
tion: Cases 1 and 2
(1) Trade integration of eco-homogeneous countries.
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(2) Trade integration of eco-heterogeneous countries
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Figure 7: Productivity Effects in the Market with Eco-labels Upon Trade Integra-
tion: Case 3
(3) Eco-difference growth across trading countries
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Note. County 𝒢 faces the increase in eco-appreciation while eco-concerns in country ℬ remains the same.
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Figure 8: Productivity Effects in the Market with Eco-labels Upon Trade Integra-
tion: the effect of cross-country eco-heterogeneity growth while the global green
demand remains constant
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indifference, free entry, and labor market clearance for each country respectively
(Appendix 10.10).
A quantitative analysis demonstrates the positive relationship between eco-
concerns and market efficiency in the open economy (Figure 8). The results are
similar to the case of increasing eco-concerns in autarky.
9 Discussion and Conclusion
This research aims at bridging the gap between international economics and en-
vironmental sociology findings: it enriches a widely used framework of heteroge-
neous firms within trade integration by introducing the eco-quality concept. The
designed eco-quality parameter is based on producer activity and environmental
concerns in the society. It introduces eco-biased consumers preferences which in-
centivise producers to implement green strategies corresponding to eco-labels.
The study considers eco-labelling a tool of current importance to study for
several reasons. First, this type of policy is widespread and growing steadily.
Second, emerging from common society concerns it provides an important channel
for the two-way influence: environmentally-biased consumers push firms to "go
green" and widely promoted corporate eco-strategies increase the perceived value
30
of green products. Third, eco-labels are differentiated in their forms yielding a
range of possible consequences for the markets.
The present research contributes to the analysis of voluntary environmental
policies by proposing a framework for the joint investigation of two main types of
eco-labels, Type I (ISO 14024) and Type II (ISO 14021). It explores a range of
productivity effects arising with VEPs in the market with autarky and upon open-
ing to trade and discloses the impact of the eco-awareness level across countries.
The results of the research can be generally aggregated into the three following
parts.
First, the model shows that more productive firms tend to self-select for eco-
friendly instruments. Accordingly, the least productive firms do not consider
environmentally-friendly strategies due to the lack of resources to launch their
own programme or join an existing one. However, within the group of green VEPs
the research explores a polarisation of voluntary environmental programmes such
that:
∙ the lower-middle productive firms introduce an internal VEP (Type II) while
they still find it too expensive to join the external VEP (Type I), even when
it is related to a higher promotion effect. In the absence of public monitoring
one can expect to find in the market a group of greenwashing lower-middle
productive firms introducing internal VEPs;
∙ the upper-middle segment of the market corresponds to more efficient firms
who can afford to join an external VEP (Type I) that guarantees a subsequent
demand shift due to the programme holder’s promotional activity. This
group tends to produce with truly eco-friendly technologies35.
∙ the most efficient and, accordingly, the largest producers prefer internal to
external VEPs forming a greenwashing leaders group. In the absence of
public control or inefficient regulations, these firms can find it profitable to
avoid external VEPs when they have enough resources to launch a wide
promotional programme saving on the corresponding production technology.
35I assume that external VEPs do not provide greenwashing policies due to the reputation
risk.
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Firms choose VEPs depending on their parameters and the size of eco-bias in
consumer demand. Meanwhile, regardless of the particular design of voluntary
regulation and the degree of environmental concerns, the most productive firms
always find greenwashing programmes profitable. These findings refer to such
anecdotal evidence as, for example, the emission scandals with ExxonMobil who
funded climate change deniers despite having received evidence of the causality
between fossil fuels and climate change36, or the Volkswagen group who used the
software to provide false positive results of diesel engines environmental tests37.
The second strand of obtained results shows that eco-labelling yields additional
productivity effects in autarky. Eco-bias preferences toughen the market compe-
tition. As a result, industries in the countries with a higher eco-awareness level
are relatively more productive in comparison with less eco-aware countries. Mean-
while, both sectors are served by, on average, less efficient producers. The effect
is observed because of the mass of firms redistributed across segments as well as
the relatively more significant changes to the green cutoff productivity levels in
comparison with the brown.
Finally, the model illustrates the impact of globalisation that depends on rel-
ative eco-appreciation across countries. In general, trade integration across eco-
heterogeneous countries boosts efficiency benefits for a relatively less eco-concerned
country, while in a relatively more eco-concerned country, globalisation decreases
average productivity in the market. Meanwhile, the effects within brown and green
sectors are opposite reflecting the firms redistribution across segments.
Accordingly, the research emphasises the role of eco-concerns as a tool to in-
fluence market efficiency. The results show the importance of developing eco-
awareness in society. But at the same time it shows that, combined with insuffi-
cient public monitoring, consumers eco-bias is capable of widening the niche for
greenwashing programmes. As a result, greenwashing practices can disseminate
quickly, discrediting the green product concept and diminishing the corresponding
positive effects. Consequently, the growth of eco-concerns should be supported by
a systematical monitoring of the quality of green products.
36Goldenberg, Suzanne (2015, July 8) "Exxon knew of climate change in 1981, email says -
but it funded deniers for 27 more years", The Guardian.
37Mathiesen, Karl, and Neslen, Arthur (2015, September 23) "VW scandal caused nearly 1m
tonnes of extra pollution, analysis shows", The Guardian.
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At same time, the application of the obtained results is limited by a number of
shortcomings. First, it considers consumers as the only source of green incentives
for producers. However, a recent survey by International Institute Management
and Development (IMD) reports that environmental policy, employees and internal
management can be even more influential than customers, civil society and NGOs
in implementing eco-friendly solutions (Comas Martí and Seifert, 2012). The power
of these agents lies beyond the borders of this research.
One more shortcoming of the model addresses the "one firm - one variety" as-
sumption, whereas there is an empirical evidence that in some cases green products
represent only a part of a produced varieties range corresponding to a relatively
low share of revenues (Comas Martí and Seifert, 2012).
The obtained results are also highly dependent on the behaviour of the average
consumer who is often not well-informed about the particular content of each eco-
label and may not be able to distinguish between them.38 Meanwhile, Carlsson
et al. (2010) report a sharp increase in the demand for environmentally friendly
products over the last 15 years.
Also the model does not allow for the heterogeneous quality of VEPs originating
out with promotional activity. Thus, eco-labels of Type I supported by NGOs
might be considered more credible in comparison with self-declarations.
Finally, the existence of greenwashing leaders can be questioned taking into
high possible reputation risks facing by big companies in case of greenwashing as
well as the potential harm for the careers of managers (Schwarcz, 2017). Accord-
ingly, high probability of disclosure can prevent firms, especially the leaders, from
environmental cheating.
Nevertheless, the developed framework provides a background for subsequent
theoretical and empirical research. Particularly, it can be useful to model different
types of environmental policies in the presence of eco-labelling. Among the range
of theoretical extensions, it may be also valuable to consider public monitoring that
can deter firms from greenwashing. One can also introduce the damage function
38For example, Chan and Muran (2009) cite a survey conducted in December 2007 by a USA-
based market research group, Leisure Trends, which discovered the fact that around one-third
of consumers are unable to verify the green claims of firms. Thus, 10% of consumers just trust
them. Moreover, only less than 50% consumers study the real content of eco-labels by doing
online research or carefully reading the labels on the packaging.
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that takes into account the corresponding improvement of the technological process
and the decrease of environmental degradation. Finally, the results of the analysis
can be used for empirical studies of particular industries.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Green internal promotion function in autarky
The promotion function of a green internal firm in autarky 𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀] is represented
as
(23)𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀](𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 = 1
Due to the assumption that firms take the price index as given, the function is
increasing in its arguments due to
𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= (1 − 𝜎) 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀]
𝜙𝑖𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀]
> 0 (24)
𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝜀
= −𝜒
′′
𝑎𝜀[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀]
𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀]
> 0, (25)
where 𝜒[𝑎, 𝜀] ≡ 𝜒[𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀], 𝜀].
10.2 Optimal profit of a green internal firm in autarky
Optimal profit of a firm implementing a green internal strategy in autarky is
represented as
(26)𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖] = 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀] + 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀] − 𝑓
Due to the assumption that the eco-quality 𝜒[𝑎, 𝜀] is increasing and concave in 𝜙,
firms do not anticipate the changes in price indexes due to their decisions, and the
relationship 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1𝜒′𝑎[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀](𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 = 1, the profit function is increasing in 𝜙:
𝑑𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖]
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜎 − 1)(𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀] + 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−2 > 0 (27)
The curvature of the profit function is determined by the sign of the expression
(28)
𝑑2𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖]
𝑑(𝜙𝑖)2
= 𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−3(𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀] + 1)
{︂
(𝜎 − 2) − (𝜎 − 1)𝑋𝑎
𝒳𝑎
}︂
,
where 𝑋𝑎 ≡ 𝑎𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎,𝜀]
𝜒[𝑎,𝜀]+1
and 𝒳𝑎 ≡ 𝑎𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎,𝜀]
𝜒′𝑎[𝑎,𝜀]
denote the elasticity of the eco-quality shifter
and the elasticity of the slope of the eco-quality shifter respectively. Thus, if
(29)𝜎 > 1 +
1
1 − 𝑋𝑎𝒳𝑎
39
the profit function is convex. Accordingly, one can rely on the over-sufficient
condition of the profit convexity 𝜎 ≥ 2.
The concavity of the function requires 𝜎 < 1 + 1
1−𝑋𝑎𝒳𝑎
that implies 1 < 𝜎 < 2.
I rule out this case from the analysis due to the following reasoning. Under this
assumption, to overcome the demand rigidness related to highly heterogeneous va-
rieties, the deceleration of eco-quality with the promotion growth should be much
lower in comparison with the eco-quality changes speed rate to force eco-friendly
consumption. Particularly, the eco-quality function should be nearly linearly in-
creasing. That requires consumers to be sharply eco-biased (high 𝜀) to maintain
nearly the same high return to green promotion. This outcome is unlikely to
be plausible. Accordingly, if the elasticity of substitution is relatively low and
identical across green and brown varieties, eco-promotion programmes seem to be
inefficient to influence the behaviour of consumers.
10.3 Productivity composition in autarky
Productivity composition in autarky is based on indifference (6)- (8), and free entry
(9) conditions and the green internal segment relationship 𝑓(𝜙*𝑏)1−𝜎𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀](𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 =
1:
(𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑚, 𝜀])
−1 =
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
(30)
(𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
*
𝑒, 𝜀])
−1 =
𝐹𝑎 − 𝑎[𝜙*𝑒, 𝜀]
ℰ − 𝜒[𝑎*𝑒, 𝜀] − 1
(31)
(𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑙, 𝜀])
−1 =
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] − 𝐹𝑎
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] + 1 − ℰ
(32)
(33)
𝑓(𝜙*𝑏)
1−𝜎
{︂∫︁
𝐵𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︁
𝐺𝑊
(𝜒[𝑎, 𝜀] + 1)𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
+ ℰ
∫︁
𝐺𝐸
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
}︂
−
∫︁
𝐺𝑊
𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀]𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
− 𝑓(1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏 ]) − 𝐹𝑎(𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑙] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒]) = 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦,
where 𝐵𝑅, 𝐺𝑊 , and 𝐺𝐸 stand for the brown, greenwashing, and green external
segments respectively.
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10.4 Comparative statics in autarky
Cutoff productivity. The eco-quality function 𝑎[𝜙, 𝜀] such that 𝑓(𝜙*𝑏)1−𝜎𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎, 𝜀]𝜙
𝜎−1 =
1, three indifference conditions (6)-(8), and free entry condition (9) allow for the
comparative statics analysis.
∙ Brown segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑏
𝑑𝜀
= 𝜙*𝑏
∫︀
𝐺𝑊
𝜒
′
𝜀[𝑎,𝜀]
𝜒′𝑎[𝑎,𝜀]
𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + ℰ ′𝜀
∫︀
𝐺𝐸
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
(𝜎 − 1)𝐼
> 0, (34)
where 𝐼 ≡
∫︀
𝐵𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︀
𝐺𝑊
(𝜒[𝑎, 𝜀] + 1)𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + ℰ
∫︀
𝐺𝐸
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙].
∙ Greenwashing lower-middle productive firms sub-segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
=
𝜙*𝑔𝑚
(1 − 𝜎).𝜒′𝑎[𝑎*𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
𝜒′𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
< 0 (35)
∙ Green external firms sub-segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜀
=
𝜙*𝑒
(1 − 𝜎).𝜒′𝑎[𝑎*𝑒, 𝜀]
ℰ ′𝜀 − 𝜒
′
𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑒, 𝜀]
𝐹𝑎 − 𝑎[𝜙*𝑒, 𝜀]
< 0 (36)
∙ Greenwashing leading firms sub-segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜀
=
𝜙*𝑔𝑙
(1 − 𝜎).𝜒′𝑎[𝑎*𝑔𝑙, 𝜀]
𝜒
′
𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] − ℰ
′
𝜀
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] − 𝐹𝑎
< 0 (37)
Due to the assumption of the eco-quality function 𝜒[𝑎, 𝜀] concavity, one can
obtain
𝜒′𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑚, 𝜀]
≥ ℰ
′
𝜀 − 𝜒
′
𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑒, 𝜀]
𝐹𝑎 − 𝑎[𝜙*𝑒, 𝜀]
≥
𝜒
′
𝜀[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] − ℰ
′
𝜀
𝑎[𝜙*𝑔𝑙, 𝜀] − 𝐹𝑎
(38)
Accordingly, ⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
≥
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑑𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
≥
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(39)
41
Average productivity.
∙ Brown segment
(40)
𝑑̃︀𝜙𝑏
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑏
𝜎 − 1
1
𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑚] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏 ]
(︂
𝑔[𝜙*𝑏 ]
𝑑𝜙*𝑏
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑏)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑏)𝜎−1}︀
+ 𝑔[𝜙*𝑔𝑚]
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑔𝑚)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑏)𝜎−1}︀)︂
< 0
∙ Greenwashing lower-middle productive firms sub-segment
(41)
𝑑̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑔𝑚
𝜎 − 1
1
𝐺[𝜙*𝑒] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑚]
(︂
𝑔[𝜙*𝑔𝑚]
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑔𝑚)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑚)𝜎−1}︀
+ 𝑔[𝜙*𝑒]
𝑑𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑒)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑚)𝜎−1}︀)︂
Thus, the effect depends on the type of productivity distribution and the form of
the eco-quality function.
∙ Green external firms sub-segment
(42)
𝑑̃︀𝜙𝑒
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑒
𝜎 − 1
1
𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑙] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒]
(︂
𝑔[𝜙*𝑒]
𝑑𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑒)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑒)𝜎−1}︀
+ 𝑔[𝜙*𝑔𝑙]
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(𝜙*𝑔𝑙)
𝜎−1 − (̃︀𝜙𝑒)𝜎−1}︀)︂
As before, the effect depends on the type of productivity distribution and the form
of the eco-quality function.
∙ Greenwashing leading firms sub-segment
𝑑̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑔𝑙
𝜎 − 1
1
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑙]
𝑔[𝜙*𝑔𝑙]
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑙)𝜎−1 − (𝜙*𝑔𝑙)𝜎−1}︀ < 0 (43)
∙ Green segment
𝑑̃︀𝜙𝑔
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑔
𝜎 − 1
1
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑚]
𝑔[𝜙*𝑔𝑚]
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(̃︀𝜙𝑔𝑚)𝜎−1 − (𝜙*𝑔𝑚)𝜎−1}︀ < 0 (44)
∙ Market
𝑑̃︀𝜙
𝑑𝜀
=
̃︀𝜙2−𝜎𝑏
𝜎 − 1
1
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏 ]
𝑔[𝜙*𝑏 ]
𝑑𝜙*𝑏
𝑑𝜀
{︀
(̃︀𝜙𝑏)𝜎−1 − (𝜙*𝑏)𝜎−1}︀ > 0 (45)
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10.5 Green internal promotion function in open economy
The green internal promotion function in open economy 𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔] is repre-
sented as
(46)𝐵
{︁
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
}︁
(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 = 1,
where 𝜒[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] ≡ 𝜒[𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔], 𝜀𝑋 ], 𝑎𝑖 ≡ 𝑎[𝜙𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔].
Under the assumption that firms do not anticipate the changes in price indexes
as a result of their decisions, the function is increasing in its arguments due to
𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= −(𝜎 − 1)(𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑋 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ])
𝜙𝑖(𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ])
> 0 (47)
𝑑𝜙𝑖
𝑑𝜀𝑋
= −
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝜀𝑋
[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ]
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
> 0 (48)
𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝜀𝑌
= −
𝜔𝑃 𝜎−1𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝜀𝑌
[𝑎𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜌𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
> 0 (49)
𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝜔
= − 𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
> 0 (50)
10.6 Green internal firm’s profit function in open economy
Profit function of a green internal firm upon opening to international trade is
represented as
(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡
[︀
𝜙𝑖
]︀
= 𝐵
{︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 1) + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ] + 1)
}︀
(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−1 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑓 ,
(51)
Under the assumption that firms do not anticipate the changes in price indexes as
a consequence of their decisions, the function is increasing and convex (under the
over-sufficient condition 𝜎 ≥ 2 - see Appendix 10.2) in 𝜙 due to
(52)
𝑑(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖]
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= 𝐵(𝜎− 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−2
{︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 1) +𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ] + 1)
}︀
> 0
𝑑2(𝜋𝑋)
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 [𝜙
𝑖]
𝑑(𝜙𝑖)2
= 𝐵(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙𝑖)𝜎−3
{︀
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 1) + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 (𝜒[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ] + 1)
}︀
(𝜎 − 2)(𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]) −𝐵−1(𝜙𝑖)1−𝜎
𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 ] + 𝜔𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌 𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑎[𝑎
𝑖, 𝜀𝑌 ]
> 0
(53)
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10.7 Productivity composition in open economy: produc-
tivity
Zero profit conditions for trading countries imply
𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 =
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
(54)
Then the productivity composition in the open economy is based on the promotion
function 𝑎𝑋 [𝜙, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔] such that
𝑓𝜙𝜎−1
{︁
𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎, 𝜀𝑋 ]{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎} + 𝜔𝜒
′
𝑎[𝑎, 𝜀𝑌 ]{(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
}︁
= 1 − 𝜔2
(55)
and on indifference (17)-(19), and free entry (20) conditions:
(56)
{︂
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]
(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
+ 𝜔𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ]
(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
(𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝑋)
𝜎−1 = 𝑓−1𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝑋
(57)
{︂
∆ℰ𝑒𝑋,𝑋
(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
+𝜔∆ℰ𝑒𝑋,𝑌
(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
(𝜙*𝑒𝑋)
𝜎−1
= 𝑓−1(𝐹𝑎 − 𝑎*𝑒𝑋){︂
∆ℰ𝑔𝑙𝑋,𝑋
(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
+ 𝜔∆ℰ𝑔𝑙𝑋,𝑌
(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
(𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝑋)
𝜎−1
= 𝑓−1(𝑎*𝑔𝑙𝑋 − 𝐹𝑎)
(58)
(59)
𝑓(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎
∫︁
𝐵𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +∫︁
𝐺𝑊𝑋
(︂{︂
(𝜒[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ] + 1)
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
+ 𝜔(𝜒[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ] + 1)
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
𝜙𝜎−1 − 𝑎𝑋
)︂
𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +{︂
ℰ𝑋
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
+ 𝜔ℰ𝑌
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
∫︁
𝐺𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] − 𝑓(1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]) − 𝐹𝑎(𝐺[𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝑋 ] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑋 ]) = 𝛿𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦,
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where ∆ℰ𝑒𝑋,𝑌 ≡ ℰ𝑌 −𝜒[𝑎*𝑒𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ]−1, ∆ℰ𝑔𝑙𝑋,𝑌 ≡ 𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑙𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ]+1−ℰ𝑌 ; 𝑋 = ℬ,𝒢;𝑌 =
𝒢,ℬ;𝑋 ̸= 𝑌 .
10.8 Comparative statics upon trade integration
Considering trade integration between two countries 𝑋 and 𝑌 , such that 𝑋 =
ℬ,𝒢, 𝑌 = 𝒢,ℬ, 𝑋 ̸= 𝑌 , from the promotion function 𝑎𝑋 [𝜙𝑖, 𝜀𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 , 𝜔] one can
obtain:
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜙*𝑏𝑋
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)−𝜎𝜒′𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]
𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ](𝜙
*
𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎 ,
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜙*𝑏𝑌
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
= 0 (60)
(61)
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )
1−𝜎(𝜒′𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ] − 𝜒′𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ])
𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ](𝜙
*
𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜀𝑋
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
= −
𝜒
′′
𝑎𝑋𝜀
[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]
𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]
,
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜀𝑌
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
= 0 (62)
(63)
𝑑𝑎𝑋
𝑑𝜙
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
= −(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙
*
𝑏𝑋)
𝜎−1
𝑓𝜙𝜎𝜒′′𝑎𝑎[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]
10.8.1 Trade integration of eco-homogeneous countries
Cutoff productivity
𝑑𝜙*𝑏
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
= 0 (64)
Average productivity
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑏
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑒
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
=
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀𝒢=𝜀ℬ
= 0 (65)
10.8.2 Trade integration of eco-heterogeneous countries
Cutoff productivity.
∙ Brown segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑏𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜙*𝑏𝒢)
𝜎(𝐼𝒢ℬ − 𝐼𝒢𝒢)
(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙*𝑏ℬ)𝜎−1𝐼𝒢𝒢
< 0 (66)
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𝑑𝜙*𝑏ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜙*𝑏ℬ)
𝜎(𝐼ℬ𝒢 − 𝐼ℬℬ)
(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙*𝑏𝒢)𝜎−1𝐼ℬℬ
> 0, (67)
where
𝐼𝑋𝑋 ≡
∫︀
𝐵𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]+
∫︀
𝐺𝑊𝑋
(𝜒[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑋 ]+1)𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]+ℰ𝑋
∫︀
𝐺𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙],
𝐼𝑋𝑌 ≡
∫︀
𝐵𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]+
∫︀
𝐺𝑊𝑋
(𝜒[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀𝑌 ]+1)𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]+ℰ𝑌
∫︀
𝐺𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙],
𝑋 = ℬ,𝒢;𝑌 = 𝒢,ℬ;𝑋 ̸= 𝑌 .
∙ Green segment
The comparative statics is analogous for all green sub-segments, thus, I report
the derivations for the greenwashing lower-middle productive firms sub-segment
only.
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜙*𝑏𝒢)
𝜎−1𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝒢
{︁
𝐼𝒢ℬ −
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]
𝐼𝒢𝒢
}︁
(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙*𝑏ℬ)𝜎−1𝐼𝒢𝒢
, (68)
where
𝐼𝒢ℬ −
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]
𝐼𝒢𝒢 =
{︁
1 − 𝜒[𝑎
*
𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]
}︁∫︀
𝐵𝑅𝒢 𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + 𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢, 𝜀ℬ](︁∫︀
𝐺𝑊𝒢
{︁
𝜒[𝑎𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]+1
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]
− 𝜒[𝑎𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]+1
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]
}︁
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
{︁
ℰℬ
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀ℬ]
− ℰ𝒢
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀𝒢 ]
}︁∫︀
𝐺𝑅𝒢 𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
)︁
.
Due to
(︁
𝜒[𝑎,𝜀]+1
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚𝒢 ,𝜀]
)︁′′
𝑎𝜀
< 0,
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
> 0 (69)
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
=
(𝜙*𝑏ℬ)
𝜎−1𝜙*𝑔𝑚ℬ
{︁
𝐼ℬ𝒢 −
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚ℬ,𝜀𝒢 ]
𝜒[𝑎*𝑔𝑚ℬ,𝜀ℬ]
𝐼ℬℬ
}︁
(𝜎 − 1)(𝜙*𝑏𝒢)𝜎−1𝐼ℬℬ
< 0 (70)
Average productivity.
∙ Brown segment
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑏𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
> 0,
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑏ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0
∙ Green segment
Analogous to the autarky case, the sign of
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑚𝑋
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
and 𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑒𝑋
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
, 𝑋 = 𝒢,ℬ,
depends on the eco-quality function and productivity distribution.
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𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑙𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
> 0,
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑙ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
> 0,
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0
∙ Market
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝒢
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0,
𝑑̃︀𝜙*ℬ
𝑑𝜔
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
> 0
10.8.3 Eco-difference growth across trading countries
To investigate the role of eco-concerns changes let’s consider eco-appreciation level
𝜀𝑋 ≡ 𝜀𝑌 + ∆𝜀, where ∆𝜀 represents the changes in eco-difference across countries.
Cutoff productivity
∙ Brown segment
𝑑𝜙*𝑏
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
=
𝐸 ′𝜙*𝑏(1 − 𝜔)
(1 + 𝜔)2(𝜎 − 1)𝐼
> 0, (71)
where
𝐸 ′ ≡
∫︀
𝐺𝑊
𝜒[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀]
′
𝜀𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + ℰ ′𝜀
∫︀
𝐺𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙],
𝐼 ≡
∫︀
𝐵𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] +
∫︀
𝐺𝑊
𝜒[𝑎𝑋 ,𝜀]+1
1+𝜔
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + ℰ
1+𝜔
∫︀
𝐺𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙].
∙ Green segment
As before, the comparative statics is analogous for all green sub-segments, thus,
I report the derivations for the greenwashing lower-middle productive firms sub-
segment only.
𝑑𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
= −
𝜙*𝑔𝑚(1 − 𝜔)
(1 + 𝜔)(𝜎 − 1)
(︂
𝐸 ′
(1 + 𝜔)𝐼
+
𝜒′𝜀[𝑎, 𝜀]
𝜒𝜀[𝑎, 𝜀]
)︂
< 0, (72)
where 𝐸 ′ ≡
∫︀
𝐺𝑊
𝜒′𝜀[𝑎𝑋 , 𝜀]𝜙
𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] + ℰ ′𝜀
∫︀
𝐺𝑅
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙].
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Average productivity
∙ Brown segment
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑏
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
< 0
∙ Green segment
Analogous to the previous cases, the sign of 𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑚
𝑑Δ𝜀
⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
and 𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑒
𝑑Δ𝜀
⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
depends
on the eco-quality function and productivity distribution.
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔𝑙
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0
𝑑̃︀𝜙*𝑔
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜔=0
< 0
∙ Market
𝑑̃︀𝜙*
𝑑∆𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
Δ𝜀=0
> 0
10.9 Quantitative analysis: numerical illustration of quali-
tative analysis
Zero profit condition for trading countries implies
𝐵𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 =
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
(73)
Then the productivity composition in the open economy with two sub-sectors,
brown and green external, is based on the following indifference and free entry
conditions:{︂
(ℰ𝑋−1)
(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
+𝜔(ℰ𝑌 −1)
(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )
1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
(𝜙*𝑒𝑋)
𝜎−1 =𝐹𝑎
(74)
(75)
𝑓(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)
1−𝜎
∫︁
𝐵𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙]
+
{︂
ℰ𝑋
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
+ 𝜔ℰ𝑌
𝑓{(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
1 − 𝜔2
}︂
∫︁
𝐺𝑅𝑋
𝜙𝜎−1𝑑𝐺[𝜙] − 𝑓(1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]) − 𝐹𝑎(1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑋 ]) = 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦,
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𝑋 = ℬ,𝒢;𝑌 = 𝒢,ℬ;𝑋 ̸= 𝑌 .
10.10 Quantitative analysis: numerical extension of quali-
tative analysis
Aggregate expenditures on green varieties in country 𝑋 are represented as
𝐷𝑋 = 𝜎𝐵𝐹
−1
ℓ
{︀
𝑀𝑒𝑋
[︀
ℰ𝑋𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 +𝜔ℰ𝑌 𝑃
𝜎−1
𝑌
]︀ ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑒𝑋 +𝑀𝑒𝑌 [︀ℰ𝑌 𝑃 𝜎−1𝑌 +𝜔ℰ𝑋𝑃 𝜎−1𝑋 ]︀ ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑒𝑌 }︀
(76)
Plugging zero profit condition (73) into (76), one can obtain
(77)
𝐷𝑋 =
𝜎𝑓
𝐹ℓ(1 − 𝜔2)
{︂
𝑀𝑋
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑋 ]
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
[︀
ℰ𝑋{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
+ 𝜔ℰ𝑌 {(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
]︀ ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑒𝑋
+ 𝑀𝑌
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑌 ]
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑌 ]
[︀
ℰ𝑌 {(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
+ 𝜔ℰ𝑋{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
]︀ ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑒𝑌 }︂
Labor market clearing condition for country 𝑋
(78)𝛼𝐿 = 𝐿𝑏𝑋 + 𝐿𝑒𝑋 +
𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑋
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
,
where
(79)𝐿𝑏𝑋 = 𝑓𝑀𝑋
𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑋 ] −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
[︃
1 + (𝜎 − 1)𝐵−1
(︂ ̃︀𝜙𝑏𝑋
𝜙*𝑏𝑋
)︂𝜎−1]︃
(80)
𝐿𝑒𝑋 = 𝑀𝑋
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑒𝑋 ]
1 −𝐺[𝜙*𝑏𝑋 ]
[︂
𝑓 + 𝐹𝑎 +
𝑓(𝜎 − 1)
𝑇𝐵
(︀
ℰ𝑋{(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎}
+ 𝜔ℰ𝑌 {(𝜙*𝑏𝑌 )1−𝜎 − 𝜔(𝜙*𝑏𝑋)1−𝜎}
)︀ ̃︀𝜙𝜎−1𝑒𝑋 ]︂
Accordingly, the equilibrium is described by six equations (74), (75), and (78)
with six unknowns 𝑀𝑋 , 𝜙*𝑏𝑋 , 𝜙*𝑒𝑋 , 𝑋 = 𝒢,ℬ;𝑌 = 𝒢,ℬ;𝑋 ̸= 𝑌 .
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